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How central should hedonic adaptation be to the establishment
of sentencing policy?
In earlier work, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
(BBM) drew some normative significance from the psychological
studies of adaptability for punishment policy. In particular, they
argued that retributivists and utilitarians alike are obliged on pain of
inconsistency to take account of the fact that most prisoners, most of
the time, adapt to imprisonment in fairly short order, and therefore
suffer much less than most of us would expect. They also argued that
ex-prisoners don’t adapt well upon reentry to society and that social
planners should consider their post-release experiences as part of the
suffering the state imposes as punishment.
In subsequent articles, we challenged BBM’s arguments
(principally from the perspective of retributive justice). The
fundamental issue between BBM and us is whether “punishment”
should be defined, measured, and justified according to the subjective
negative experiences of those who are punished, an approach we
refer to as “subjectivism,” or whether the more compelling approach
is to define and justify punishment, more or less, in objective terms

Copyright © 2011 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
* D’Alemberte Professor, Florida State University College of Law; A.B., Harvard
University; M.Phil., University of Cambridge; J.D., Harvard Law School.
** Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D.
(Philosophy), University of Chicago.
***Assistant Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. We thank Mitch Berman,
Kenworthey Bilz, John Bronsteen, Richard Boldt, Danielle Citron, Bob Condlin, Mary Anne
Franks, Brooks Holland, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Adam Kolber, Will Ourand, Amanda
Pustilnik, Rob Rhee, Max Stearns, and Alec Walen for comments and conversations regarding or
related to this Essay.

605

MFG.doc (Do Not Delete)

606

5/10/2011 11:39 AM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:605

such that the amount need not vary based on experiences of offenders
alone.
In their responsive essay, “Retribution and the Experience of
Punishment,” BBM responded to our challenges. This Essay of ours
now assesses the impact of their responses, again from the
perspective of retributive justice. We remain not only principally
unpersuaded as to the conceptual and normative responses, but we
use this Essay to explain further the wrong turns associated with
BBM's decision to endorse subjectivist concerns as the principal
measure and justification for the infliction of retributive punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
If Oscar the offender is a generally happy person and able to bounce back
from disappointments quickly, should those charged with determining and
implementing sentences take his adaptability into account? Does it matter if
Oscar is better or worse at adapting than his criminal peers?
Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur (“BBM”) provoked these
and other questions in their article Happiness and Punishment (HP).1 We
addressed their thesis emphasizing hedonic adaptation in earlier articles,2 where
it became clear that the fundamental issue between BBM and us was whether
1. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur (“BBM”), Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009) [hereinafter HP].
2. For those joining the conversation, BBM first wrote HP; Dan Markel and Chad Flanders
(“MF”) then wrote Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 907 (2010) [hereinafter BOS]. Around the same time, David Gray wrote
Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619 (2010) [hereinafter PAS]. BBM then responded
to MF in Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1463 (2010)
[hereinafter REP]. MF invited Gray to join in for those portions of this reply that relate to shared
interests.
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“punishment” should be subjectively or objectively evaluated. BBM defined,
measured, and justified punishment according to the subjective negative
experiences of those who are punished, an approach we refer to as
“subjectivism.” In our earlier articles, we argued that the more compelling and
coherent approach was to define and justify punishment from a more objective
perspective, a view we will call “objectivism.”3
In their recent response, Retribution and the Experience of Punishment
(REP), BBM challenge our views. There they clarify their earlier arguments,
emphasizing their limited interest in the adaptability of the “typical” offender
rather than the specific experiences of particular offenders.4 As to whether an
individual’s ability to adapt to punishment should factor into the calculation of
his or her punishment, BBM now state unambiguously that they are
“agnostic[.]”5
Accordingly, we now understand BBM to contend that to constitute
“punishment,” a practice must cause a reduction in the typical offender’s selfassessment of happiness.6 Importantly, BBM still adhere to the two main
conclusions they advanced earlier in HP: (1) because offenders typically adapt
to prison and fines, longer sentences and larger fines do not necessarily inflict
more negative experience, and thus may fail as proportionate punishment;7 and
(2) because offenders do not adapt well upon release from prison, they deserve
additional consideration (in the form of leniency) from retributivist social
planners.8 Thus, notwithstanding the apparent shift in interest described above
(from ex post and ex ante beforehand to ex ante only now), BBM remain
committed to the view that punishment must be focused on the suffering
experienced by offenders.
In this Essay, we assess the impact of the claims advanced in REP. In
short, we are neither persuaded by the merits of the positions they defend nor
by their critiques of our views.
We begin in Part I by highlighting BBM’s claim that they are agnostic as
to the merits of calibrating actual punishment ex post in light of individual
variances in adaptability. Whether this is a concession to our earlier arguments
3. Two caveats regarding labels. MF’s views are perhaps better labeled as “intersubjective,” but for purposes of this reply, and to emphasize MF’s overlapping agreement with
Gray, we embrace the “objectivist” moniker. Second, although we adopt the objectivist label for
this exchange, MF earlier emphasized the need for retributivists to consider individual experience
in a few significant contexts such as mental competence. Those “concessions” to individualized
subjective experience are chiefly not at issue here.
4. REP, supra note 2, at 1464.
5. Id. at 1464, 1469 n.28.
6. Id. at 1468.
7. Id. at 1465.
8. Id. at 1482 (“[A]ny retributive theory of punishment . . . should account for the expected
negative hedonic effects associated with illness, unemployment, strained social relations, or any
other detriments that are proximately caused by prison and reasonably foreseeable to state
authorities.”).
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or merely a clarification of their prior views, we find this development to be an
improvement of sorts. Nevertheless, it raises several concerns. The first,
developed in Part II, is interpretive. By our lights, BBM cannot adopt a position
of “ex post agnosticism” without running afoul of their stated views about the
mechanics of retributive proportionality.9 We briefly consider ways in which
their position of ex post agnosticism could be vindicated, but ultimately find
that BBM provide no principled or pragmatic basis for such a view. We stress
this point because, in our earlier work, we detailed numerous absurd or
unattractive results that follow from individualized calibration.10 BBM’s
current agnosticism on ex post tailoring may be an attempt to avoid these
results, but BBM remain committed to views about proportionality and
punishment that still lead to those unsavory consequences.
Our second concern is conceptual. Thus, in Part III, we elaborate the
argument that BBM’s subjectivism (even as newly clarified) yields a
conceptually distorted understanding of punishment, one that crudely
predicates punishment on self-reports of happy feelings without sufficiently
considering the significance of human understanding and its relationship to
social meaning in our theory of punishment.
In Part IV we address the policy implications of BBM’s recently stated
views. BBM are curiously opaque on the practical upshot(s) of their positions.
As we detail, their views are still consistent with a range of bizarre and
unappealing policies governing the distribution of punishment. Moreover, as
we explain in Part V, BBM’s analysis of what we call the “post-prison blues”
confirms our view that they are continuing to smuggle in non-retributive
concerns to advance claims about retributive justice.
Finally, we note that BBM’s latest sally not only reprises earlier flawed
arguments, but also introduces a series of misunderstandings about our account
of punishment. In Part VI, we endeavor to defend our views from
mischaracterization. In so doing, we hope to clarify the contours of our existing
disagreements. Whether we are right on the merits, we leave for readers to
decide.
I.
AN IMPORTANT SHIFT REGARDING EX POST AGNOSTICISM?
In HP, BBM claimed that “for a retributivist, it is of core importance to
understand the actual amount of harm that punishment inflicts.”11 They repeat
this view a number of times in similar language,12 giving rise to the inference
9. While not directed at BBM, Adam Kolber develops this point. See generally Adam J.
Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009).
10. See, e.g., BOS, supra note 2, at 974–84; PAS, supra note 2, at 126–38, 162–65.
11. HP, supra note 1, at 1069 (emphasis added).
12. See id. at 1070 (“[I]f increasing the amount of a fine or the length of a prison term does
not increase the harm imposed on an offender to the degree expected, then any quantum of
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that BBM cared about the relevance of prisoner adaptability measured not only
for offenders as a class ex ante, but also at the individual level ex post. That
conclusion was supported by BBM’s explicit endorsement of views and arguments recently advanced by Adam Kolber, which focus on the capacities, baselines, and experiences of offenders measured on an individual, ex post basis.13
BBM now emphasize what we will call their “ex post agnosticism,”14
explicitly disclaiming views on whether punishment should be tailored ex post
to individuals based on their varying capacities for hedonic adaptation.15 They
nonetheless maintain their views that hedonic adaptation should be central to
any persuasive retributive account that seeks to set punishment policy ex ante
for the “typical offender.”16
Regardless of whether BBM’s ex post agnosticism marks a shift in their
stated views, or is merely a clarification of their earlier views, we believe that
such ex post agnosticism is an improvement of sorts in that it is less offensive
to ideals of equality and autonomy than ex post individualization. Nevertheless,
we find ourselves skeptical that BBM can justify such ex post agnosticism. Part
II explains that skepticism.
II.
IS BBM’S SUBJECTIVISM PLAUSIBLE WITHOUT SOME EX POST
INDIVIDUALIZATION?
BBM now claim to be neutral on the question of whether to adjust
punishments ex post based on the variance in suffering experienced by
individual offenders. But this newly articulated view is in tension with their
earlier work and with principles fundamental to their subjectivism. In our
earlier articles we explained the dangers inherent in adjusting punishment on an
punishment carries less retributive force than has been supposed.”) (emphasis added); id. at 1071
(“[I]n order to deliver the deserved punishment, the state needs to be able to adjust the amount of
imposed harm.”) (emphasis added); id. at 1072 (“Even more so than utilitarianism and expressive
theories of punishment, which place at least some importance on the severity that a given
punishment is perceived to have, pure retributivism concerns itself with the actual severity of
punishment.”) (emphasis added and omitted).
13. Id. at 1069 (“Kolber has argued that the actual experience of negativity is central to
punishment theory, and we credit his position. According to Kolber, different individuals’
experiences of punishment must be taken into account. His arguments to that end support our
contentions as well, and we refer readers to those arguments.”) (emphasis added) (citing Kolber,
supra note 9, at 196); cf. Kolber, supra note 9, at 186 (“Retributivists who fail to consider
variation in offenders’ actual or anticipated experiences of punishment are not measuring
punishment severity properly and are therefore punishing disproportionally.”).
14. See REP, supra note 2, at 1464, 1469 n.28 (“[W]e reiterate our agnosticism about
whether the actual differing experiences of individual criminals are relevant.”).
15. Id. at 1464 (“Unlike Kolber, we claim only this: to the extent that adaptation affects the
experience of punishment that the typical person is expected to have, adaptation is relevant to
punishment.”).
16. Id. at 1465 (“We believe . . . that if adaptation significantly affects the way that a
typical person experiences punishment, then that fact must be central to any persuasive theory of
punishment.”).
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individual basis based on ex post measurements of suffering.17 Perhaps to avoid
some of these difficulties, BBM now distance themselves from that view,
though they offer literally no reason for their ex post agnosticism. Nor can they.
We believe that the logic of their views on retributive proportionality compels
them in the direction of ex post individualization.
In both their earlier and more recent work, BBM express a fundamental
concern with securing proportionality between the negative experience inflicted
by the state and the gravity of the offense.18 But if retributive punishment is
understood as the amount of negative experience a sanction inflicts—a position
we dispute but BBM still affirm—then this renders BBM vulnerable to the very
claim they use as a cudgel against retributivists who do not emphasize
subjective experiences. That is, on pains of violating their understanding of
retributive proportionality, each individual offender must be made to suffer the
right amount. That is impossible to achieve without taking account, ex post, of
individual differences in adaptation.
Consider: suppose that Oscar is worse at adapting to prison life than other
offenders. If he is punished as the “typical” offender, then he will suffer more
“negative experience” than his crime warrants. In contrast, suppose Bob easily
adapts to prison. Then Bob will end up also suffering disproportionately less
than is required by his crime. This violates proportionality as conceived by
BBM (along with Adam Kolber).19 The most plausible logical inference would
be to inflict additional suffering on resilient offenders and to take it easy on
those who are less resilient.
We think this argument applies to BBM because of their organizing
principle that “people live life subjectively, not objectively.”20 Assuming they
are right, it is no stretch to say that people do not suffer “typically,” but rather,
people suffer individually. Because people vary at least somewhat in resilience
or adaptability, it is implausible to retain a commitment to proportionality (as
BBM understand it) and simultaneously aver that adaptation is “central” at a
general level at the ex ante stage,21 but not substantially relevant—let alone
17. See sources cited supra note 2.
18. HP, supra note 1, at 1069 (“Imposing too much punishment for a minor crime is
retributively unacceptable, as is imposing too little punishment for a major crime. . . . And because
punishment is linked inextricably with negative experience, retribution can be implemented only
via a spectrum of punishments that impose varying degrees of negative experience. The level of
negativity must be adjusted to accord with the offender’s desert.”); REP, supra note 2, at 1467
(“Adaptation reduces differences in the amount of negative experience typically imposed by
differently sized fines or incarcerations. We contend that this fact significantly limits the capacity
of fines and incarcerations to achieve the goals of proportionality.”); id. at 1465; infra note 29 and
accompanying text.
19. We borrow this argument from Adam Kolber. See Kolber, supra note 9, at 213, 236.
We do not think that Kolber’s critique has any bite on justifications for punishment like ours, but
it surely does against BBM’s because of their reliance on the idea that punishment must generate a
quantum of negative experience.
20. REP, supra note 2, at 1474.
21. See id. at 1465.
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“central”—at an individual level at the ex post stage. This tension is especially
hard to understand if it turns out there are opportunities for policies to reflect
some (cheaply administered and empirically validated) assumptions of adaptive
variance across individuals or small groups. Indeed, if punishment is concerned
with what people actually and subjectively experience, then we have to look at
the “actual experience” of the offender, as BBM put it in HP,22 not at the
experiences of the “typical offender.”
We must also note that BBM are unclear about who the “typical offender”
is. The possibilities are numerous: (a) the typical person who commits crimes,
(b) the typical person who commits crimes and gets convicted, or (c) the typical
person who commits crimes and is then imprisoned. The demographics of these
categories are likely to vary substantially. This is worrisome because BBM
mean to pick out an empirically measurable category of people rather than a
legal fiction like “the reasonable person.” Moreover, BBM prescind from
explaining why we ought to care about the typical offender’s adaptive
capacities instead of the typical citizen’s. Whichever group is the benchmark,
however, will cause results that, on BBM’s views of proportionality, are too
harsh for some and too easy for others.
These unhappy results cannot be avoided once one identifies retributive
punishment with the need or desire to cause offenders a quantum of negative
experience. By contrast, if punishment is understood as the polity’s
communicating to the offender condemnation of his acts by depriving him of
things that are objectively good, such as liberty or property, then these issues
do not arise.
BBM are therefore faced with a dilemma: on one horn is the host of
normative problems identified in our earlier articles regarding their
understanding of retributive proportionality; on the other is some form of
objectivism they purport to reject. BBM might try to avoid this dilemma by
identifying reasons why concern for adaption ex ante need not devolve into
accommodating adaptation ex post. However, they have not done that work.
Hypothetically, BBM might appeal to a non-monetized form of costbenefit analysis to rescue their subjectivism.23 They could then argue that
adaptation should be central to sentencing policy ex ante, but not ex post,
because individualized tailoring might be too costly (in terms of information
costs) or too dangerous (to other values or goals). Although this might be a
sensible and pragmatic view, it is not one that BBM have advanced. What’s
more, even were this position expressly adopted, BBM would have to
recognize that part of the cost of failing to tailor based on individual variances

22. HP, supra note 1, at 1068.
23. Cf. BBM, Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1628–33 (2010) (describing wellbeing analysis as similar to but distinct from traditional cost-benefit analysis).
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in adaptive skills would be a failure to give each offender the experiential
suffering he or she purportedly deserves.
Furthermore, the cogency of such a “pragmatic” view is predicated largely
on tenuous assumptions. In particular, one would have to assume that: (a)
attention to adaptation ex ante would solve more problems (in terms of crime
control or other relevant end-states for a consequentialist analysis) than it
causes, and (b) attention to adaptation ex post would cause more problems than
it solves. These assumptions are not defended, let alone addressed. Finally, for
purposes of this particular conversation between BBM and us, such an appeal
to cost-benefit analysis would require harmonizing the discourse of cost-benefit
analysis with retributive justifications of punishment, a task that might be
possible but requires more work than BBM have so far done.24
Because BBM do not offer a more nuanced cost-benefit analysis, and in
light of Kolber’s arguments regarding proportionality that they credited in their
earlier work, we think that there is no principled reason they can offer as to
why adaptation matters to punishments ex ante for the typical offender but not
ex post for individual offenders. For reasons we soon sketch, we think that this
should incline BBM to our view, which is that punishment is better understood
as something other than the sum of negative experiences caused by penal
practices and technology.
III.
FROM SUFFERING PUNISHMENT TO UNDERSTANDING PUNISHMENT
Assuming, arguendo, that BBM’s ex post agnosticism is a tenable position, we believe BBM’s recently stated views about the relevance and centrality
of adaptation to retributive punishment are still conceptually worrisome.
In Bentham on Stilts, we argued that adaptation would, practically
speaking, prove to be largely insignificant and should remain so from a
retributive perspective. Understandably, this diagnosis distresses BBM, who
think adaptation should direct sentencing policy rather than be merely
theoretically relevant.25 However, BBM have offered no new and compelling
arguments to explain why, given our social world, a stiffer coercive
condemnatory deprivation of liberty or property would ever be understood as a
less severe punishment even if prisoners were able to adapt to more prison or
stiffer fines. Consequently, our view is that adaptation will remain quite trivial
from a policy perspective because the social understanding of the meaning of
punishment is (and ought to be) much richer than a snapshot of hedonic levels
as measured by self-reported surveys during confinement. Specifically, when
punishment is understood as resting primarily upon the communication of

24. Cf. BOS, supra note 2, at 944–45 (discussing the relationship between retributive
justice and consequentialism).
25. REP, supra note 2, at 1465.
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censure to the offender (and the coinciding expression of that censure to the
citizens throughout the polity) through coercive deprivations, punishment is not
reducible to reductions in “happiness” as measured by self-reported surveys.
By any reasonable measure, life in prison is substantially and objectively
less desirable than life outside prison. Prisoners are physically confined,
physically controlled, and may access only a very narrow range of pleasures
and pursuits. That prisoners may turn out to be relatively happier than they or
the public anticipated ex ante does not alter that general assessment. Rather, it
shows that prisoners can be emotionally flexible and can adjust expectations
based on the realities of their circumstances. The same can be true of fines.
Consequently, to the extent that the hedonic adaptation studies BBM rely upon
can be extrapolated to penal policy,26 one can only observe that such “facts”
have little relevance given the overwhelming objective badness of (nearly all)
conventional punishments.
The conclusion that our conventional punishments are objectively
undesirable is actually and unsurprisingly supported by the data upon which
BBM rely. BBM report that ex-convicts, despite having previously adapted to
the objective badness of prison life, fear future imprisonment as much as, if not
more than, those who have never been imprisoned. BBM seem startled by these
results.27 We are not. What these results reveal is a repudiation of the
fundamental premise of BBM’s argument, namely, that what makes
punishment undesirable is its ability to inflict self-reported unhappiness. On the
contrary, what makes punishment undesirable—and therefore communicates
condemnation—is that it entails coercive deprivations (of liberty and/or
property), which are objectively viewed and understood as undesirable. In
assessing that objective undesirability, there is no need to restrict ourselves to
the self-reports of happiness provided by those currently in prison.28
In short, the social meaning of punishment cannot be artificially confined
to what offenders typically “feel.” According to BBM, retributive punishment
is only successful as a communicative device if and to the extent it inflicts

26. In BOS, we largely refrained from challenging the inferences drawn from the studies
relied on by BBM. This does not mean we agree with those inferences. See, e.g., infra notes 32,
37, and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., HP, supra note 1, at 1061 (noting that “remarkably,” prisoners do not learn
that they adapt to prison life).
28. Indeed, even if we accepted the view that what principally matters for setting
punishment policy is the offenders’ experiences, we do not understand why policymakers should
consider only some time-sliced reports of hedonic experiences (such as those occurring during
confinement). Presumably, if repeat offenders revert to prior levels of anxiety about punishment
even though they have experienced positive adaptation in their prior confinement, then that means
that even the typical experience (which should include memories as well as anxieties) of
punishment changes over time (probably in a “typical” way), and that should also be considered.
To our minds, once one becomes more reflective about past and future, we think that is good
evidence of a capacity to understand condemnatory actions, not just feel suffering in response to
them.
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proportionately more negative experience.29 But this formulation is wrong:
punishment is not just experienced, but also understood as condemnation.
Accordingly, whether and how much offenders suffer in response to
imprisonment do not inherently affect prison’s status as “punishment.” Rather,
prison serves as retributive punishment on our view when it is understood by
the polity as condemnatory and coercive.30 There is no serious argument that a
term of imprisonment or a fine imposed upon a finding of criminal guilt fails to
express or communicate some condemnation. Nor is there any serious reason to
doubt that the polity (which includes current and former prisoners) regards
more time in prison or larger fines as more undesirable, even if offenders
hedonically adapt. For the general public, the longer sentence is understood to
represent a longer period of constraint on liberty and an increased dimension in
lost opportunities to define and pursue the good life. For offenders who actually
lose those liberties, the calculus is unlikely to be different.31
We doubt that adaptation, even significant adaptation, could disrupt, let
alone overturn, the underlying social meaning of most punishments. To see
why, imagine an offender who opposes his sentence initially but realizes over
time that his experience of incarceration is warranted and in fact serves as an
opportunity for personal reform. He pursues self-education, counsels fellow
prisoners, apologizes to his victims, and thereafter does good within the prison,
deriving a deep sense of contentment. The message of condemnation is not lost
on him, nor does his coerced constraint cease to be punishment merely because
he subjectively experiences contentment. Quite to the contrary, here we have a
prisoner who is “happy” precisely because he is being condemned—he is
“perfecting” his freedom by accepting the punishment for his offense against
others. Even if this admittedly odd situation typified the arc of experience for
most offenders, we would not hesitate to say that imprisonment under these
conditions would still be punishment because it adequately expresses and
communicates condemnation to the polity and the offender respectively.
29. REP, supra note 2, at 1466 (“[W]e argue that punishment communicates condemnation
because and insofar as it is associated with negative experience.”); id. at 1467 (“Adaptation
reduces differences in the amount of negative experience typically imposed by differently sized
fines or incarcerations. We contend that this fact significantly limits the capacity of fines and
incarcerations to achieve the goals of proportionality. If we are right, then adaptation is important
to any punishment theory that values proportionality, including Gray’s and MF’s theories.”)
(citation omitted); id. at 1472 (“For the same reason that imposing negative experience
communicates condemnation, imposing greater negative experience communicates greater
condemnation than imposing lesser negative experience.”).
30. The offender, we emphasize, must also, as a threshold condition, rationally understand
that he is being punished on account of his offense. See generally Dan Markel, Executing
Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163 (2009).
Needless to say, the capacity to understand condemnation and the capacity to experience the
sensation of pain are different.
31. If it is, that may be evidence that the person is not a fit interlocutor for retributive
punishment because he does not understand social meanings. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
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On our view, subjective negative experiences alone cannot properly be
considered the defining and reasonable limits on the production of social
meaning. BBM’s mistake here is bound up with their apparent failure to
appreciate the crucial role of legitimate democratic processes in constructing
the social meaning of many public acts, including punishment. Legitimately
adopted laws and legal practices in democratic states are semiotically
generative: that is, they not only reflect social meaning but also help shape it.
For that reason, the “negative experience” associated with paying $500 to the
government in taxes is different in meaning and consequence as compared to
the “negative experience” arising from paying the same $500 as a criminal fine,
though in both cases the loss of the $500 might generate the same hedonic dip
and then adaptation.32 Individual subjective experiences and aggregate
subjective experiences may serve in this context as heuristic devices for
gauging condemnation, but it would be a mistake of Platonic dimensions to
misconstrue the image for the object by assuming these experiences represent
condemnation. Indeed, BBM’s understanding of social meaning is fully
backwards. People subjectively perceive liberty deprivation as a bad because it
objectively is bad (that is, it is bad for beings like us).33 BBM mistakenly treat a
heuristic for finding out what is bad—our subjective experience—as being
constitutive of what is good or bad.34
Once our critical point—that human understanding is informed by more
than one’s experience alone—is recognized, one can successfully resist BBM’s
thesis that we must incorporate hedonic adaptation into mainstream sentencing
practice and policymaking. As long as it is reasonable for people in our society
to think that a politically sanctioned constraint of liberty communicates
condemnation, and that stiffer sanctions signal yet greater condemnation,
adaptation among typical offenders need not play a central or even prominent
role when setting sentencing policy.
If subjective experience were indeed central, then small changes in the
ability of offenders to adapt to suffering could indeed have large implications
for proportionality. But since we think the important thing is the objective
badness of a punishment, our position is not hostage to minor shifts in
subjective feelings. So, for us, adaptation will almost certainly remain an
insignificant aspect of setting punishment policy.
32. Interestingly, BBM’s discussion of monetary penalties in HP cites studies that only
pertain to (generic) economic loss, not the particular loss of money connected to fines. See BOS,
supra note 2, at 926 n.75. Here, if anywhere, is a good example of how the same thing (a loss of
money) could have radically different social meanings—where, to paraphrase BBM, the state’s
choice to impose something on people is part of what makes it condemnation. See REP, supra
note 2, at 1470–71.
33. In general, adaptation to a bad does not make that bad into a good, or even less of a
bad. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Who Is the Happy Warrior? Philosophy Poses Questions
to Psychology, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S81, S99–S100 (2008).
34. See REP, supra note 2, at 1465.
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IV.
THE POLICY CONSEQUENCES
BBM’s current view—that the adaptive skills for the typical offender
should be central to retributive determinations of sentences—raises a number of
policy concerns. Indeed, their reluctance to be specific is telling.35 What would
the world look like if their views were implemented? As we suggest below,
depending on how the empirical findings emerge, BBM’s views regarding
adaptation could lead to longer sentences, shorter sentences, uniform sentences,
or quietism.
For our part, we are especially worried that their rhetoric about adaptation
may suggest that punishments in America are simply not harsh enough because
prisoners will adapt to them. Consistent with a desire to match popular views
about how much prisoners should suffer with what offenders typically suffer,
one plausible upshot of BBM's proposal would be to lengthen prison sentences
considerably. If it is true that the study of adaptation reveals that current
sentences involve less negative experience than is intended by a subjectivist
approach to punishment, then punishments must be increased so that actual
negative experiences more neatly match intended negative experiences,
rendering offenders’ suffering more nearly “proportional” to popular views
about how much prisoners should suffer for their crimes. If punishment must
inflict targeted levels of subjective unhappiness, and current practice inflicts
less unhappiness than the polity originally thought, then BBM commit us to
imposing harsher sentences (if need be), so that just as offenders adapt to one
level of hell, another is upon them. Punishment on this view is little more than
a complicated pain-delivery device.
BBM might wish to resist the implied recommendations of longer or
harsher punishments, but such aversion must—for them—be determined by the
empirics of experience, not the principles associated with understanding social
meaning. Importantly, the empirics could lead to further odd policy
recommendations. For example, if some adaptation studies are to be extrapolated, then we perhaps should reduce the duration of incarceration but make the
peak of suffering especially onerous and painful along with the last few days
for each offender—on the theory that the global or comprehensive memories of
those experiences will likely be an average of the peak and last few days, rather
than a recall of the average pain level through the sum total of time.36

35. See id. at 1481 (“We do not offer specific or concrete prescriptions for the practice of
punishment. Instead, we describe a phenomenon so as to help people understand better what
punishment actually does.”).
36. See Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive
Judgment and Choice, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec. 8, 2002), available at http://nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf (discussing findings of pain from
colonoscopy procedures).
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Alternatively, a policy that gave all offenders the same objective
punishment regardless of their offense would be consistent with making
adaptation central to setting sentencing policy. The predicate for such a policy
would be an empirical finding that, despite a short, sharp hedonic dip in
response to punishments such as fines or imprisonment, offenders typically
revert to their prior mean levels of reported hedonic affect. If such empirical
results occur, and there is some reason to think so based on BBM’s review of
the literature, hedonic adaptation on these terms might be so strong that we
would effectively have to abandon any hope of implementing proportionality
between the offense and the negative experiences of the offender.37 To the
extent that the state cannot achieve a sustained and proportionate impact on the
negative experience for the typical offender using conventional measures, the
polity might as well adopt a “second-best” measure of imposing any short,
sharp sanction on all offenders—on the supposition that anything more would
be superfluous. In other words, BBM’s enthusiasm for the lessons of hedonic
adaptation could paradoxically lead to blunter—rather than granulated—
conventional sentences. But if an adaptation-is-central perspective leads to
roughly the same objective punishments for murderers and car thieves alike,
then that would provide ample reason to be suspicious of it.
To be fair, we could imagine BBM attempting to resist the efforts toward
blunting by sincerely putting adaptation concerns above efficiency and other
reasonable concerns regarding the social cost of the sanction imposed. But
since they view themselves as Bentham’s heirs,38 it would be puzzling if
adaptation provided a categorically stronger reason for action in a particular
direction (anti-blunting efforts) than, say, the diminished well-being that comes
from wasting money on excessive sanctions that provide little extra actual
suffering. One would think that all options should be on the table for them.
Finally, although BBM believe offenders adapt too “well” to match
conventional imprisonment or fines, they also raise reasonable concerns about
the difficulty of ex-prisoners’ failures to adapt to their lives upon reentry to
society. Thus, because “typical” offenders do not adapt well post-release, BBM
believe that retributivists committed to experience-adjusted proportionality
must tailor punishment to account for their anticipated excess suffering.
While we elaborate our disagreements related to offenders’ “post-prison
blues” in Part V, it bears mentioning that BBM might respond to the “excess
suffering” of post-release life by advocating that polities simply discount all

37. BBM may not support such an extreme result, but it is suggested when BBM
hypothesize, e.g., that the different term of years served by murders is only “slightly more severe”
(measured in negative experience) than the term of years served by larcenists, REP, supra note 2,
at 1478, or that “people adapt to imprisonment such that they typically do not experience a tenyear sentence as much worse than a five-year sentence,” id. at 1479.
38. See BBM, supra note 23, at 1586 & n.7 (defending a “Benthamite concept of
hedonism”).
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terms of incarceration for offenders based on the difficulty the typical offender
faces upon release from prison. Naturally, this sits in tension with the thrust of
the previous discussion, which suggests more draconian sentencing is needed to
deal with the experience of adaptation to prison life itself. The two vectors of
argument are directly opposed and the question becomes which vector is more
forceful. If they are about the same magnitude for the typical offender, then
perhaps the best solution is simply to do nothing because the hedonic
consequences of their “post-prison blues” simply offset the hedonic
consequences of adaptation to prison. But if the “post-prison blues” are (on
average) worse than the in-prison experience of hedonic adaptation, then it
seems the state must (per BBM) craft policies designed to limit the unhappiness
caused during or after a term of incarceration, or somehow jettison prison
altogether. On these important policy issues, BBM are silent.
V.
THE STATE AND THE “POST-PRISON BLUES”
Despite a desire to focus their efforts on improving our understanding of
the nature of retributive punishment and proportionality, BBM’s analysis of the
“post-prison blues” only makes matters of understanding punishment worse. As
we elaborate below, contingent post-reentry experiences are not properly
thought of as part of the punishment that retributivists must justify because they
are not part of any conventional definition of punishment. If the hardship
endured by the offender is not authorized, intentionally imposed, and
proximately caused by the state, then it is a conceptual error to call it
“punishment,” even if it involves negative experience to the offender after his
offense. Otherwise, almost anything could be categorized as punishment. On
BBM’s logic, every time a prisoner is released and drives over an unfilled
pothole near the prison, the resulting damage is punishment so long as the state
reasonably foresees the pothole will likely cause damage to some people
(including offenders).39
A. What is “Punishment”?
BBM not only fault our position for being inattentive to how prisoners
adapt to prison life, but they also reemphasize their earlier argument that
retributive theories in general do not sufficiently take into account the suffering
offenders may experience after they are released from prison.40 Any retributive
39. See, e.g., REP, supra note 2, at 1488. The mistake BBM make here is a conflation of
statistical knowledge with individualized knowledge and the assumption that the former is always
as culpable as the latter. See discussion infra Part V.B.
40. To illustrate, BBM correctly note that we generally believe “disease, unemployment,
and dissolution of family and social relationships . . . should be excluded from the calculus of
proportionality.” REP, supra note 2, at 1482. Compare, for example, their view about various
contingent but foreseeable harms. See id. at 1495 (“[T]hese ‘echoes of imprisonment’ form part of
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theory, they write, “should account for the expected negative hedonic effects
associated with illness, unemployment, strained social relations, or any other
detriments.”41 Conceding that this assertion needs qualification to avoid
absurdities, a point we stressed in our earlier work, BBM view these harms as
only relevant to punishment if they are “proximately caused by prison and are
reasonably foreseeable to state authorities.”42 While BBM are on the right track
by adding these qualifications, we think that this formulation still leads to an
array of conceptual problems.
Most importantly, they still retain the puzzling view that the response to
any such moral responsibility by the state for such harms should be effectuated
through the currency of sentencing adjustments.43 We find this view especially
odd in light of the fact that, from the clarification BBM made regarding the
typical offender (discussed in Part I), one must infer that the projected offsets
will benefit all offenders through an average discount rather than just those
who “actually” experience such contingent harms.
The essence of our disagreement here is largely conceptual,44 but it also
has some practical implications. State punishment, in our society at least, is not
the disease an offender may contract in prison. It is not what happens to the
offender after his release, either—which again is not to say that the state has no
interest in helping those released from prison. Rather, we think state
punishment is best and conventionally thought of as those intended, coercive,
condemnatory deprivations inflicted against persons in response to their crimes
and by state officials who are authorized to inflict those deprivations. This
narrower definition is common within the punishment literature;45 on this view,
disease, prison rape, or divorce are not punishment because they are not the
the state’s punishment of the criminal.”). From this we infer that BBM believe they should be
included in the calculus. At the same time, BBM concede that “some cases of unemployment or
divorce may be due to independent decisions to avoid people who have broken the law.” Id. at
1485 (emphasis added). They do not, as far as we can see, give us a sufficiently precise guidepost
to distinguish harms that are the state’s responsibility to ameliorate through punishment discounts
(as opposed to potential other remedies) from those that are not the state’s responsibility or those
that are the state’s responsibility to remediate through nonpunitive measures such as
compensation.
41. REP, supra note 2, at 1482.
42. Id. at 1482. Indeed, the words and ideas of proximate causation and foreseeability
appear nowhere in HP.
43. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
44. The fact that it is conceptual in nature—i.e., a dispute over a value-neutral definition of
punishment—does not mean that we are trying to perpetrate some improper “definitional stop”
argument. See LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 27–28 (2006) (analyzing
“definitional stops” in punishment theory). We simply think that BBM’s conflation of crimes,
torts, and punishment signals an abuse of language akin, to use Zaibert’s example, to saying “I
forgive you, though I believe you have done nothing wrong.” Id. at 28.
45. See id. at 21 (observing the “contemporary trend” of legal scholars to focus discussion
of punishment not on the practice of penalties or censure in the family or workplace but rather as a
state institution and thus entailing the requirement of limiting punishment to authorized and
intended deprivations).
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product of lawful and intended authorized state action that the polity’s officials
are tasked to see through to completion. They simply do not qualify. Our
commitment to maintain a clear distinction between state authorized
punishment on the one hand and crimes/torts/bad luck/self-destructive choices
on the other hand governs not only the incidental suffering endured by
offenders during prison, but also the range of contingent harms that befall them
after they are released from the supervision of the state.
To be clear, legal relief should sometimes, depending on the circumstances, be available to those offenders who are subsequently victims of torts or
crimes: for example, when the polity and its officials are causally involved and
morally blameworthy for some unintended and unauthorized experiences of
suffering endured by prisoners during and even after prison. We maintain,
however, that simply because the state is in some way causally responsible or
even blameworthy for a harm of this sort does not imply that the harm itself is
“punishment” that must be justified by retributivist theories of punishment,
such as ours, or otherwise remediated through some form of off-setting
leniency. The state’s violations of its duties would typically entail or permit
remedies including compensation, medical treatment, or injunctive relief, not
wholesale punishment discounts.46 Indeed, if the harms experienced are
actionable constitutional torts, then they likely deserve some remedy, not
because these harms are punishment but precisely because they are not.
The desire for legal relief in some situations, however, must also be
juxtaposed against the reality that there will be numerous situations where the
offender endures suffering (not authorized by the state qua punishment) that is
nonetheless without any remedy either from the state or a third party. For
example, if a sadistic murderer has trouble getting dates after prison because he
has become a less agreeable person after his prison experience, his lackluster
love life is not punishment—at least not state retributive punishment—because
those inflicting harm on the offender by turning down dating requests are
independent agents who are neither acting for the state nor subject to state
authority. There may be very few catches for sadistic murderers, and that might
be something the offender has to own—rather than seek relief from—at the
hands of the state. Various sources of “post-prison blues” that BBM want to
address may be analogous to the unlucky-in-love murderer. Here again, BBM’s
tendency to see so much suffering experienced by offenders as punishment is
likely to blame.
It does no service to BBM’s argument against us to identify a number of
post-imprisonment legal disabilities that offenders may incur upon release. As
we noted in BOS, these disadvantages are distinct from the harms inflicted by
third parties, and we think that BBM are wrong again to conflate them with the
46. Of course, as we noted in BOS, if the state “broke” the offender through its officials’
tortious activity, we could imagine the state’s forfeiting its warrant to further punish that person,
but this would be an exceptional circumstance. BOS, supra note 2, at 961 n.193.
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legal disabilities under a nebulous cloud of proximately caused negative
experience. With respect to some of these restrictions or disabilities, the state
may indeed be continuing its message of condemnation. Denying the franchise
to felons might qualify, as might automatic removal in the cases of some
immigrant offenders. In other cases, the state may simply be instituting
measures that are intended to protect society, such as with limitations on the
rights of violent ex-felons to carry firearms and the withdrawal of professional
licenses from those convicted of crimes relating to abuses of their professional
positions. In all these scenarios, the state is expressing something, but the
message will be different depending upon the circumstances. In some cases, the
message is condemnatory (and reasonably thought of as part of the punitive
calculus); in others, the message may be reasonably understood to convey
nothing more than one of risk containment. Lumping all of these state-imposed
legal consequences together under the label “punishment” does not further the
debate, because some are, and some are not, punishment.
In reply, BBM might answer by saying that “[n]either society nor
punishment theory should turn a blind eye to the suffering incarceration is
known to cause after offenders have been released from confinement, and there
is no good reason to exclude this consideration from the framing of
punishments in the first place.”47 We agree that society should not be
indifferent towards the statistically predictable suffering of its members, but we
do not believe that this goal should be identified as one of retributive theory’s
principal concerns. Since BBM are attacking our retributive ideas, we hasten to
point this out.48 We might think that society should care about vast inequalities
of wealth, but we do not think that this necessarily means, for example, that
every criminal law should be altered to be a vehicle for redistributive goals.
This does not necessarily reflect a view on moral priorities, but, rather, a
commitment to maintain important disciplinary boundaries. The alternative
view, which BBM continue to endorse, conflates torts and crimes with
punishments. Their view is especially odd in light of the proliferation of
offender reentry programs, the existence of which undermines their claim that
the state is “impos[ing] negative post-prison consequences on former

47. REP, supra note 2, at 1466.
48. It should be said that some utilitarians might not view the realm of criminal justice as a
distinctive lever of social policy; to them, it is just one of many that are capable of advancing
utility. For those who share that view, there is nothing inherently wrong with effacing the
disciplinary boundaries of justice that we have tried to maintain. After all, if one has a “well-being
analysis” hammer, every problem looks like a hedonic nail. See BBM, supra note 23, passim
(championing well-being analysis for policy issues). But our point regarding the importance of
boundaries and who causes which harms to whom and under what justifications is relevant here as
it illuminates the thrust of our worry earlier elaborated upon in BOS, namely, that BBM are just
giving the world warmed-over utilitarian arguments even though they purport to be making a
critique internal to the discourse of retributive justice.
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prisoners.”49 It is counterintuitive to find the state imposing the “reentry” harms
it is expressly trying to prevent through reentry programs.
What is at stake here? Well, as a practical matter, our view is that if
offenders are the victims of torts or crimes, inside or outside of prison, then the
proper legal response should not be some blanket punishment discount for all
offenders based on projections of difficult adaptation, but rather compensation
to specific victims, targeted injunctive relief, and public prosecution of those
who criminally wronged the offender, whether inside or outside of prison. And
if it is just bad luck or the fault of the offender that causes the “post-prison
blues,” then the harms must fall where they do, preempting a legal remedy.
Of course, as a prescriptive matter, to the extent that BBM believe that
social planners should focus some resources on ensuring successful offender
reentry, we agree. And inasmuch as BBM hold the view that, all things
considered, there is too much use of incarceration in terms of scope and
duration, then we share that view too. But these convergences, if they exist,
mask our rather fundamental theoretical disagreement.
For us, the task of successful reentry for offenders does not emerge from
our retributive commitments so much as our humanistic and prudential ones. It
may well be that the state has a number of interests in helping offenders reenter
society to “get back on their feet” or at least help them steer clear of
criminality. But we think that whatever the state’s interests in this area are, they
are best kept separate from the question of retributive justifications for
punishment. Conversely, our desire to see sentencing reform (in the form of
both reducing the gross amount of incarceration and searching for alternatives
to prison) is in fact a piece of our retributive commitments.50
B. A Related Note on Culpability and Aggregated Acts
Part of BBM’s argument relies on the claim that because the state has a
choice of punishment tactics, when the state chooses to punish one way it also
chooses to embrace as part of the punishment any incidental bad consequences
caused by that mode of punishment that are reasonably foreseeable.51 When
they consider these consequences, BBM do not focus on the individual
consequences to any one offender. Rather, they tend to look at the experience
of offenders as a whole, for instance, that they are more likely to suffer disease
or poverty.

49. REP, supra note 2, at 1493.
50. See generally Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87 (2010);
David Gray & Jonathan Huber, Retributivism for Progressives: A Response to Professor Flanders,
70 MD. L. REV. 141 (2010); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?
Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157
(2001) (criticizing over-reliance on incarceration).
51. REP, supra note 2, at 1484, 1488.
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The problem here is that while BBM say that the state has its choice of
punishments, they do not say which type of punishment would be better on the
whole than imprisonment. This is important. What BBM fail to realize (or
acknowledge) is that if it is permissible (i.e., not negligent or worse) to punish a
single offender through prison notwithstanding the small risk that some harm
post-prison might contingently occur, then it is also permissible to punish
offenders generally in the same way notwithstanding that the foreseeable
likelihood of some incidental harm increases with the number of persons
punished. This is what Professor Simons has called the principle of “invariant
culpability when acts are aggregated,”52 which deserves brief mention here.
Consider the following: If we drive to the store one day with care and
caution, we would likely be permitted to say this activity is reasonable by
comparing the various social and private benefits and costs. If we drive to the
store one thousand times, with the same care and caution, however, there is a
much higher likelihood of an accident causing an injury to someone. The
incidence of an accident does not necessarily change the culpability of the actor
even if we know we are more likely to be involved in an accident if we drive a
thousand times than if we only drive once. In order for BBM’s argument to
succeed, they would need to show that there is something negligent (or even
more culpable than negligence) about imprisoning any offender on account of
the contingent harm that person may experience. But this is a critically
important argument about prison usage that they have not provided.
VI.
SOME MISSTEPS REGARDING OUR ARGUMENTS
Even with the lines between us and BBM clearly drawn, we would be
remiss to leave unaddressed BBM’s more dubious charges against retributivism
generally, and the specific conception of retributivism discussed in BOS. A few
deserve special mention, which we turn to below.
A. Fears of Communicative Unilateralism
When defending the relevance of the “post-prison blues” to retributivist
calculations of proportional punishment, BBM reject the claim that the polity is
only responsible for the intentional communication of condemnation occurring
within the punitive encounter over which the state has control and authority.53
We have already explained how BBM mistakenly assume that the state’s
responsibility for a foreseeable and proximately caused harm must result in the
form of penal leniency.

52. Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed 23–25 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of
Law, Working Paper No. 10-26, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1673266.
53. REP, supra note 2, at 1490–92.

MFG.doc (Do Not Delete)

624

5/10/2011 11:39 AM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:605

In the course of their analysis of punishment as intentional communication, however, BBM raise a different point: what if a prisoner thinks he is
still being punished even after he has been technically released from state
supervision?54 The state, they argue, “cannot define the content of its messages
by authorial fiat” and the state does not have the “right to specify the meaning
of a sentence.”55
Once again, BBM underappreciate the significance of social meaning and
its genesis.56 As we discussed in Part III, when a liberal democratic polity
comes together and announces that some conduct is blameworthy and
condemnable as a crime, such statements are entitled to a kind of prima facie
deference. Of course, such deference must coincide with independent judicial
review, and to our mind, there has to be a reasonable basis for legislative action
before the polity can use a criminal sanction to promote particular objectives.
But this desire for at least some (nontrivial) restraint upon criminal law’s scope
is pretty uncontroversial among many criminal law theorists.
Here is the upshot: as long as some nontrivial restraining conditions hold,
then there is little reason to credit BBM’s concern that the state is issuing an
unreasonable “authorial fiat” or is unilaterally communicating some bizarre
message to an offender when the polity is reflecting or generating the social
meaning associated with punishment in this context.
As a result, there is no reason to credit just any interpretation of a
punishment given by an offender qua offender. Rather, the polity need only be
constrained by the reasonable interpretation of the sentence imposed, and this
will largely follow the polity’s perspective since it is the polity that is creating
and reflecting the social meaning involved here. To see this in less abstract
terms, consider a prisoner who is hit by a bus upon being released from prison.
He may blame the state, perhaps because he is not as nimble as he was preprison. On our view, he would not be reasonable in thinking that this injury was
part of the state’s punishment of him, and that the state was trying to
communicate its condemnation via the bus or even by making him more
vulnerable to the bus. Similarly, we believe it is entirely plausible to attribute to
prisoners the knowledge of the difference between being imprisoned and the
contingent harms that befall them after imprisonment, even if in moments of
deep frustration they might succumb to more diffuse and undifferentiated forms
of resentment.
Relatedly, BBM’s claims regarding communication of punishment here
wrongly suggest that our account of communicative punishment would be
satisfied simply by “verbally conveying” the message of condemnation.57 In
fact, we explained in detail why coercive condemnatory sanctions are needed to
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 1487–88.
See supra Part III.
REP, supra note 2, at 1468.
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make the communication a plausible one, and why reliance upon mere epistles
and declarations from the sovereign are insufficient.58 Briefly put, the social
meaning of such epistles or declarations is important; in our world, such
missives would fail to achieve adequate and effective condemnation in the case
of many offenses. To rest on rebuke in the absence of coercive sanctions would
create a signal of faux condemnation, indeed, perhaps even a signal of
impunity.
B. Fears of Semantic Unilateralism
Elsewhere, BBM chastise us for ostensibly misunderstanding the nature of
communication. Specifically, they claim that our usage of the idea of
communication (which we explicitly distinguish from expression) runs counter
to the way scholars in other fields use the term “communication.”59 As a result,
they use the word “communication” to connote a meaning that we specifically
identified in BOS as an expression, not communication.60
Their objection is misplaced. The fact that scholars outside punishment
theory lump together communication and expression does not mean that we
have to, especially if we call attention to our stipulated definitions, as we do,
and have reasons for distinguishing between instrumental justifications of
punishment (that would look at expressions by the state to the public) and noninstrumental justifications of punishment (that would focus on communicative
practices to the offender). Moreover, the distinction between communication
and expression has a by-now familiar ring in the legal literature of which BBM
should be aware.61
Relatedly, we think there is little problem with invoking the idea of a
shared collective intent behind the polity’s communication of condemnation to

58. See BOS, supra note 2, at 931–40; see also Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of
Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 402 (1965) (“[C]ertain forms of hard treatment have become the
conventional symbols of public reprobation. This is neither more nor less paradoxical than to say
that certain words have become conventional vehicles in our language for the expression of
certain attitudes, or that champagne is the alcoholic beverage traditionally used in celebration of
great events, or that black is the color of mourning.”). Of course, as Anthony Skillen remarked,
Feinberg likely overstates the claim that hard treatment is merely a “signal” of reprobation much
like the wearing of black is a signal of mourning. “[I]t is pretty clear that losing money, years of
liberty, or parts of one’s body is hardly neutral in that way.” Anthony Skillen, How to Say Things
With Walls, 35 PHILOSOPHY 509, 517 (1980). Rather, per Skillen, our “[punitive] practices
embody punitive hostility, they do not merely ‘symbolize’ it.” Id. If Skillen is correct, then it
surely reinforces our view that the hard treatment aspect of state punishment is necessary in order
for punishment to communicate reprobation adequately, though of course the “hardness” of the
treatment can be calibrated using objective metrics capable of ex ante determination, such as
months in prison or fines based on percentages of net wealth.
59. See REP, supra note 2, at 1490–91 & n.117.
60. See id. at 1490; cf. BOS, supra note 2, at 929–30 & n.89 (distinguishing between
communication and expression).
61. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2000) (explaining the distinction).
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offenders when it attaches punishments to defined crimes.62 BBM actually rely
upon this notion (perhaps unwittingly) throughout their critique, such as when
they refer to a state being “reckless” with respect to the harms caused by
punishment.63 Moreover, their critique of us—that “the state is a they, not an
it”64—founders on their conflation of intention with motivation. We agree that
it may be difficult to find agreement on the motivation for action when it is
undertaken by an institution, club, or nation-state, because in those situations
persons might agree to authorize, ratify, or undertake action for different
reasons. However, we think it is quite conventional and useful to ascribe a state
of mind (like intent) to an action undertaken by a polity or other governable
groups.65 Otherwise, how would the state, to use BBM’s own argument, be
reckless regarding the harms it causes to offenders?66
C. Some Remaining Challenges
BBM offer some other objections to our argument along the way; we will
deal with them only briefly here, since they are, to our mind, ill-formed and
largely irrelevant.
First, they argue that when we say that offenders might bear the
responsibility for some of the consequences they suffer after prison, we are
sounding in “theories of comparative negligence that are familiar from tort
law” but have no place in criminal law.67 In response, we note the origins of the
concept are not relevant so much as its utility in the given context. And surely
the concept of comparative or contributory negligence is fair game for
understanding the issues here. Indeed, in making the argument we did, we
meant no more than what BBM ultimately conceded, namely, that “the criminal
should bear some of the moral responsibility for the consequences of his
actions.”68 What we emphasize here is that: (a) not all the consequences for
which the state may be responsible are rightly considered part of the state’s
punishment; (b) those harms for which the state is responsible need not
necessarily be (and usually should not be) remediated through punishment

62. REP, supra note 2, at 1489.
63. Id. at 1493–94 & n.132 (discussing the recklessness of the state’s “state of mind”
regarding the harms it is aware of and uncritically describing the state as an actor capable of
having a reckless state of mind).
64. Id. at 1489.
65. See, e.g., Philip Pettit, The Reality of Group Agents, in PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 67 (C. Mantzavinos ed., 2009),
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/2009/Reality%20of%20Group%20Agents.
pdf.
66. REP, supra note 2, at 1493–94 & n.132 (discussing the recklessness of the state’s “state
of mind” regarding the harms it is aware of and uncritically describing the state as an actor
capable of having a reckless state of mind).
67. Id. at 1495.
68. Id.
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discounts; and (c) the state is not responsible for those harms for which the
offender or a third party is better thought of as the proximate cause.69
Second, BBM assert that our claim that offenders could have avoided
punishment if they had chosen not to commit a crime entails that prison is not
punishment.70 This badly misunderstands our argument. BBM misread our
position to be that if a prisoner could avoid his punishment by not committing a
crime, then his imprisonment is not really a punishment. This would be an
absurd thing to say. On the contrary, our claim is that the criminal cannot
reasonably blame the state for all the consequences of his conduct (including
the intended and contingent aftereffects of prison). The question at this point is
not about whether to call something “punishment.” The question is whether the
criminal can disclaim some or all responsibility for those harms he experiences
after incarceration and instead blame the state. We think it reasonable to hold
that he cannot blame the state unless the state somehow has caused those
collateral consequences by acts of malfeasance or nonfeasance. Our basic point
here, which we take to be rather uncontroversial, is that it would be absurd for a
criminal to say that he is not responsible for his imprisonment or its collateral
effects simply because the state imposed upon him the punishment he deserved.
Undeserved harm suffered in prison, or post release as a result of state action,
is, of course, another matter entirely. But here again, we think that BBM miss a
crucial distinction.
CONCLUSION
BBM’s arguments rest on the maxim that “people live life subjectively,
not objectively.”71 Perhaps much of our disagreement with them boils down to
our skepticism that the thorough-going subjectivism stated in their maxim can
provide any bedrock upon which to build institutions of justice, retributive or
otherwise. Whether in political theory, law, or theology, much of the entire
enterprise of seeking justice is properly focused on pushing us outside of
ourselves in search of something with more normative weight than our
idiosyncratic views and experiences. We do not simply accept people’s
preferences—racist, sexist, adaptive, maladaptive, or otherwise—as given and
immutable, and thus the best foundation upon which to build public policy.
Rather, we try to think about what people ought to believe, given our best
judgments and arguments about what justice requires in a heterogeneous
political union.
Consequently, BBM’s appeal to aggregating and averaging subjective
experience is largely a source of problems, not solutions. Most damningly from
69. See BOS, supra note 2, at 971.
70. REP, supra note 2, at 1496 (characterizing our claim as arguing that because “the
criminal can reasonably avoid a penal harm by simply not committing a crime in the first place,
that harm is not punishment”).
71. Id. at 1474.
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the perspective of political philosophy—of which the philosophy of (state)
punishment is a branch—“subjective experience” alone cannot capture
complicated ethical assessments of the good life shared with others in a moral
polity. That is in part why we believe that we should, when defining and
justifying punishment, reason about which subjective experiences are worth
having and promoting, and about which objective goods are reasonable for
people to pursue.
While this exchange with BBM may not have minimized the distance
between us on these issues regarding the sources of value, it has served to
clarify our differences with three sophisticated scholars whose advocacy for
their brand of subjectivism has helped us see our own views, and theirs, with
greater clarity. Accordingly, the game has been well worth the candle.

